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Abstract
In discussion in which there participate almost all intellectuals (including the lawyers) who deal with 
broadly understood social sciences, the sintagma of human rights has been detectable for centuries. Its 
understanding however has been and still is ideologically conditioned. The present paper was inspired 
by Jerzy Kolarzewski’s monograph on Idea praw jednostki w pismach Braci Polskich. U narodzin 
nowożytniej koncepcji praw człowieka [The idea of rights of an individual as depicted in the papers 
of Polish Brethren. The genesis of modern concept of human rights, Warszawa 2009]. The present 
contribution, apart from presenting the aforementioned study, tries to make a general reﬂ ection on the 
method of conducting legal history research by those who are engaged in seeking the links of “genetic” 
characters between the legal history phenomena and the phenomena of contemporary law. In other 
words the researchers that come into play are those who try to arrive at the moments of “concepts” 
of contemporary legal concepts, as set in history. These researchers try to juxtapose them upon the 
“genetic principle”. 
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Transporter dans des siècles reculés toutes les idéses du siècle où l’on vit,
c’est des sources de l’erreur celle qui est la plus féconde.
Montesquieu, L’Esprit des Lois XXX, ch. 14
1. Status quaestionis: “Human Rights” and the concept of 
“Human Rights” in the past and present times
A syntagma “Human Rights” – both in the meaning of “norms of conduct of general 
character, enacted and guaranteed by a state”, and in the meaning of “rights which one 
can derive from (aforementioned) formally binding norms”2 – is commonly regarded as 
one of the most fundamental notions in Legal Dictionaries and Compendia of Law. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on 10th of December 1948, announces in its Introduction explicite: “Whereas 
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members 
of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”. The 
Declaration distinguishes between three types – generations of rights: citizen’s freedoms 
and political rights (civil and political rights), and social, economic and cultural rights.3 
In a contemporary discourse, “human rights” are afﬁ rmed as an emanation of the 
inherent dignity of a man and a reﬂ ection of moral rights manifests in common moral 
language,4 conceivable however – mostly for the reason of indetermination and openness 
of a regulated matter itself as well as a controversial status of “a right” itself – only due 
to and only after the existence of democratic procedure.5 Despite a generally dominant 
opinion concerning their unique social and political value, as well as a thesis regarding 
their fundamental, inherent and privileged character, which nota bene makes – as a valid 
– a claim to their universal legal force, in the same time explaining the possibility of their 
2  With reference to possible meanings and possible dimensions of “human rights”, cf. A. Łopatka, Pra-
wo człowieka – reﬂ eksje wokół pojęcia [A Human Right – Reﬂ ections around the Meaning of a Term] [in:] 
AA. VV., Teoria prawa. Filozoﬁ a prawa. Współczesne prawo i prawoznawstwo [Legal Theory. Legal Philo-
sophy. Contemporary Law and Jurisprudence], Toruń 1998, p. 139. 
3  For further reading, cf., inter alia: K. Opałek, Koncepcja praw, wolności i obowiązków człowieka 
i obywatela. Jej geneza i charakter [The Concept of Rights, Freedoms and Obligations of Man and of Citizen. 
Its Genesis and Characteristics] [in:] Prawa i obowiązki obywatelskie w Polsce i na świecie [Civil Rights 
and Obligations in Poland and over the World], Warsaw 1978, p. 18 f; T. Włudyka, Ekonomiczne prawa 
człowieka – mit czy rzeczywistość [Economic Rights of Man – a Myth or a Reality] [in:] Studia z ﬁ lozoﬁ i 
prawa [Studies on the Philosophy of Law], ed. J. Stelmach, Cracow 2001, p. 259–268; about so-called group 
(collective) rights, cf., e.g.: A. Michalska, Podstawowe prawa człowieka w prawie wewnętrznym a pakty 
praw człowieka [Elementary Human Rights in a Proper Legal System of a Country and Bills of Human 
Rights], Warsaw 1976, p. 204 f.; and G. Cohen-Jonathan, René Cassin et la conception des droits de l’homme, 
1985, “Revue des droits de l’homme” t. 12, p. 83 f. 
4  Cf., in part. M. Ossowska, Normy moralne w obronie godności człowieka [Moral Norms as Protective 
for a Human Dignity], „Etyka“ [“Ethics”] 1969, vol. 5, p. 12 f; M. Piechowiak, Godność jako fundament 
powinności prawa wobec godności człowieka [A Dignity as a Fundament of a Duty of Law towards a Hu-
man Dignity] [in:] Urzeczywistnienie praw człowieka w XXI wieku [Realization of Human Rights in the 21st 
century], eds. P. Morciniec, S.L. Stadniczeńko, Opole 2004, p. 33–54.
5  Cf. J. Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen. Studien zur politischen Theorie, Frankfurt a.M. 1996, 
p. 301 f.; idem, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen 
Rechtsstaats, Frankfurt a.M. 1992, Chapter III. 
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non-justiﬁ cation,6 “human rights” – as a slogan – are quite often used for diverse scopes, 
not always acceptable from the moral point of view.7 “Human rights” are also rejected 
nowadays, by means of negation of their existence, critic of their ideology or refusal of 
their rationality as a proper idea.8 Nevertheless, both as a postulate of a generally noble 
“matter” or a motto reinforced by a claim of an indispensability of their recognition and 
a respect for them, as a recognition of fundaments of justice and peace all over the world 
or a true and real moral value rational and worthy to be realized, “human rights” are 
undoubtedly one of a main topic of a contemporary ethical, legal and political discourse 
– a discourse not rarely truly complex and interdisciplinary.9 The Author of a book which 
constitutes an inspiration for presented remarks, emphasizes that already mentioned is-
sue in his Introduction as a universal dimension of human rights, even describing them 
as “the most rousing political idea of our times” (p. 7).10 
In consequence, it can be certainly declared that “invoking human rights” means 
invoking something “right and noble”.11 This could be a reason for attempts – con-
tinuously undertaken in a modern scholarship – to prove their presence in more 
or less distant various discourses of the past, namely, an ancient,12 a medieval13 
6  Cf. W. Osiatyński, Wprowadzenie do pojęcia praw człowieka [Introduction to a Notion of Human 
Rights], Warsaw 1998, p. 4. 
7  Cf. B. Wolniewicz, O tzw. prawach człowieka [About so-called Human Rights] [in:] Z. Musiał, B. Wol-
niewicz, Ksenofobia i wspólnota [Xenophobia and Community], Cracow 2003, p. 92: “Tak zwane ‘prawa 
człowieka’ są pewną ﬁ kcją prawną, dla jakichś celów i dążeń politycznych najwyraźniej propagandowo uży-
teczną.” [So called ‘human rights’ are a kind of legal ﬁ ction, evidently useful for some political scopes and 
needs.”]; cf. also remarks on p. 93, 94; comp. P. Bała, A. Wielomski, Prawa człowieka i ich krytyka. Przy-
czynek do studiów o ideologii czasów ponowożytnych [Human Rights and their Critics. An Introduction to 
Studies on Ideology of Post-Modern Times], Warsaw 2008, p. 114 f. 
8  As an exemplary opinion, cf. a remark by B. Wolniewicz, O tzw. prawach człowieka [About so-called 
Human Rights], p. 91: „Rzecz w tym, że człowiek nie ma w ogóle żadnych przyrodzonych ‘praw’; ma tylko 
przyrodzone obowiązki” [The point is that a man does not have any innate ‘rights’; on the contrary, he has 
innate obligations”]. Comp., however, J. Henriot, Note sur la date et le sens du mot responsabilité, “Archives 
de Philosophie de Droit” 1977, vol. 22, p. 45–62, who underlined that a term of “obligation” appeared in the 
same moment as a term “right”.
9  Comp. V. Grementieri, Comparative Law and Human Rights [in:] European Legal Tradition and 
Israel, ed. A.M. Rabello, Jerusalem 1994, p. 369–376.
10  Comp. E. Brems, Human Rights. Universality and Diversity, The Hague–Boston–London 2001. 
11  Cf. D.C.H. Broussard, Prologo ai diritti dell’uomo [in:] Tra diritto e storia. Studi in onore di L. Ber-
linguer promossi delle Università di Siena e Sassari, T. I, Catanzaro 2008, p. 613–643; cf. aussi E. Messer, 
Anthropology and Human Rights, “Annual Review of Anthropology” 1993, vol. 22, p. 221–249; E. Le Roy, 
Les droits de l’homme entre un universalisme hâtif et le ghetto des particularismes [in:] L’effectivité des 
droits fondamentaux dans les pays de la communauté francophone, Montréal 1994, p. 59–74.
12  Cf. AA.VV., Human rights in ancient Rome, ed. R. Bauman, London–New York 2000; with a critic by: 
M. Talamanca, L’antichità e i ‘diritto dell’uomo’ [in:] Convenzione del Consiglio d’Europa per la protezione 
dei diritti umani e delle libertà fondamentali. Atti del Convegni Lincei 174, Roma 2001, p. 51 f.; comp. how-
ever, in plus of a possibility of ﬁ nding “human rights” in the Roman antiquity: T. Honoré, Ulpian: pioneer of 
human rights, 2nd ed., Oxford 2005; G. Giliberti, ‘Omnium una libertas’. Alle origini dell’idea di diritti umani 
[in:] Tradizione romanistica e Costituzione, a cura di L. Labruna, curr. M.P. Baccari-C. Cascione, vol. I, t. 2, 
Napoli 2006, p. 1992 f.; and recently S. Tafaro, Centralità dell’uomo (persona) [in:] Studi per G. Nicosia, 
vol. 8, Milano 2007, p. 97 f; idem, Ius hominum causa constitutum. Un diritto a misura d’uomo, Napoli 2009. 
13  Cf., quite recently, with reference to concepts of Marsilius of Padua: M. Merlo, Marsilio da Pa-
dova: il pensiero della politica come grammatica del mutamento, Milano 2003; Marsilio da Padova (con 
testo latino del Difensore della pace e traduzione di C. Vasoli), curr. E. Ancona, F. Todescan, Padova 2007; 
or a study – quoted by the Author – by T. Jasudowicz, Śladami Ehrlicha: do Pawła Włodkowica po naukę 
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and a modern one.14 It is however, beyond any doubts that not sooner than the epoch of 
Enlightenment it can be mentioned about the appearance of a technical notion of “human 
right”, as a result of elaboration of philosophically coherent concept of “human rights” 
founded on the idea of personal freedom as well as on the postulate of restriction of the 
power of a state based on the concept of absolutism and as a justiﬁ cation of a recogni-
tion of an independence of a state. Considering this process, it must be remembered that 
some primary attempts of positivisation of rights were already linked with natural law,15 
even though they were ascribed only to a determined group of people,16 and they con-
stituted mostly a considerable form of limited political and legal agreement to address 
speciﬁ c political circumstances. In spite of such consciousness and such acceptance of 
this particular caesura of the “conceptual nature of human rights”,17 scholars constantly 
searched (and still do) for stable and ﬁ xed moments of this particular laic humanism of 
the Siècle des Lumières, in a spiritual infrastructure of the western-European civilization 
even before the 18th century, being somehow convinced that a human being could never 
let the idea to develop without restraint. In consequence, he created dogmas or he sought 
for ontological justiﬁ cation for phenomena regarded as socially needed. 
2. Internal Perspective – the Author: “Rights of an Individual” 
in a discourse of the Polish Brethren (Arians)
Accepting the thesis that every right, numbered nowadays among the catalogue of hu-
man rights, did not appear ex nihilo (p. 8), the Author – as a historian – applied himself 
a task consisting in extracting from meanders of the history some perpetual tendencies 
and trains or – as he determined his scopes himself – ﬁ nding “links of continuation” 
o prawach człowieka [After Ehrlich: towards Paul Wlodkowic for the Concept of Human Rights], Toruń 1995. 
Comp. also, a recent study by M. Piechowiak, Klasyczna koncepcja osoby jako podstawa pojmowania praw 
człowieka. Wokół św. Tomasza z Akwinu i Immanuela Kanta propozycji ugruntowania godności człowieka 
[The Classical Concept of a Person as a Basis of Understanding of Human Rights. Around a Postulate of 
Enrooting of the Men’ Dignity, proposed by Saint Thomas Aquinus and Immanuel Kant] [in:] AA.VV. Prawo 
naturalne – natura prawa [Natural Law – a Nature of Law], eds. P. Dardziński, ks. F. Longchamps de Bérier, 
K. Szczucki, Warszawa 2011, p. 1–20. 
14  Cf. studies quoted by the Author: p. 221–231.
15  Comp. U. Wesel, Geschichte des Rechts. Von den Frühformen bis zur Gegenwart, München 2002, 
p. 74 f., 407 f.; G. Stourzh, Naturrechtslehre, leges fundamentales und die Anfänge des Vorrangs der Verfas-
sung [in:] Rangordnung der Gesetze: 7 Symposion der Kommission „Die Funktion des Gesetzes in Geschich-
te und Gegenwart” am 22–23 April 1994, Hg. Chr. Starck, Göttingen 1995, p. 13 f. 
16  Cf. I. Szabo, Fondements historiques et développement des droits de l’homme [in:] Les dimensions 
internationales des droits de l’homme, réd. K. Vasak, Paris 1978, p. 13 f.; M. Villey, Le droit et les droits de 
l’homme, Paris 1983; comp. also F.W. Wieacker, Foundations of European Legal Culture, “The American 
Journal of Comparative Law” 1990, vol. 38 fasc. 1, p. 1–29; and quite recently rev. E. Sobański, O Karcie 
Praw Podstawowych UE [With reference to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union] [in:] 
Zmagania początku tysiąclecia [Struggled of the Beginnings of Millennium], eds. M. Gierycz, J. Grosfeld, 
Warsaw 2012, p. 185 f. 
17  The Author himself situated a moment of appearance of the concept of human rights in the times of 
Enlightenment, ibidem, p. 8, 10. 
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binding the past and the present reality.18 Such attitude must be regarded as a particular 
one and undoubtedly shows the Author’s consciousness of his mission as a mission of 
historian, not only as an investigator of the past but also as an analytic of the modernity.19 
Nevertheless, already at present, it should be asked if such a perspective, namely, “to 
follow the thread to the end” or – using scientiﬁ c language – to search for genitive rela-
tions between today’s phenomena and postulates that could be found in works written in 
the past, is reasonable and justiﬁ ed in a present case. Perhaps, at least from a scientiﬁ c 
point of view for the reason of scholarship correctness, it would be better to ﬁ x the objec-
tive in order to identify and to determine so-called functional parallels between “human 
rights” as a component of the contemporary philosophical, ethical or political discourse, 
and “individual rights” as a moment of reﬂ ection of the Polish Brethren in the 16th and 
17th century. Undoubtedly, as the Author already proved, claims for a respect of rights 
and freedoms of an individual, a religious tolerance, a preservation of private property 
or a determination of reasonable just (i.e. balanced) relations between the state and citi-
zens, constituted truly signiﬁ cant slogans in social and political program of this confes-
sion – the Ecclesia Minor or Minor Reformed Church of Poland, a particular “product” 
of middle-European reformatory movement. Those questions, nota bene, had already 
been a topic of analysis as the thought of the Polish Brethren phenomenon is regarded 
– both by Polish and foreign authors20 – as a truly particular in comparison to other 
doctrinal views of Western European thinkers of those times.21 Taking it into account, it 
seems to be somehow curious that the Author just in the closing part of his book – i.e. in 
Conclusions (p. 214–216) – mentioned a history of research on the Arians’ thought. One 
could regard such a catch as an “eristic” trick, which ab initio helps the Author to present 
himself as the one among researchers who – as the ﬁ rst one – had noticed the aforemen-
tioned phenomenon and had put a question about its historical aspect and signiﬁ cance. 
This impression is justiﬁ ed especially by the fact that only after the whole presentation 
of the source material and its analysis a reader can reach a set of statements concern-
18  On the subject of such tendencies present in contemporary “sub-legal” history, i.e. romanistics un-
derstood as research on ancient Roman law, cf. recently T. Giaro, Cywilizacja prawa rzymskiego i problemy 
współczesnej romanistyki [Civilization of Roman Law and Problems of Contemporary Romanistics], “Acta 
Universitatis Vratislaviensis”, Prawo 2008, vol. 305, p. 73: „koncepcje wpływologiczne” [“inﬂ uentive con-
cepts”]. 
19  Comp. J. Łojek, Obrachunki metodologiczne [Accounts with a Methodology] [in:] idem, Wokół 
sporów i polemik. Publicystyka historyczna [Around Disputes and Polemics], Lublin 1991, p. 6 f; cf. also 
S. Amsterdamski, Między historią a metodą. Spory o racjonalność nauki [Between History and Method], 
Warsaw 1983, p. 19 f., 42 f; idem, Etos uczonych: kilka pytań [The Scholars’ Ethos: Some Questions] [in:] 
idem, Tertium non datur? Szkice i polemiki [Terium non datur. Studies and Polemics], Warsaw 1994, p. 147 f; 
comp. also F. Znaniecki, The Social Role of Men of Knowledge, New York 1968, p. 45 f.
20  From foreign authors writing about the Polish Brethren, cf. in part. E.M. Wilbur, A History of Unita-
rianism: Socinianism and Its Antecedents, Harvard 1945; G.H. Williams, The Polish Brethren: Documenta-
tion of the History and Thought of Unitarianism in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and in the Diaspora 
1601–1685, Atlanta GA 1980; and, more recently, P. Hewett, Racovia: An Early Liberal Religious Commu-
nity, Providence 2004.
21  Cf. works written by one of the unquestioned authority in the ﬁ eld of the research on presence and 
position of Poland in Modern Europe, as well as the particularity of the Polish gentry and its culture, i.e. 
J. Tazbir, those quoted by the Author: p. 228–229; and additionally, Wielka karta polskiej tolerancji [The 
Great Bill of Polish Tolerance] [in:] idem, Polska na zakrętach dziejów [Poland in the Course of the History], 
Warszawa 1997, p. 29 f. 
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ing points of view of a doctrine proposed in the past, before the Author. The same must 
be said about a passus concerning so-called “justiﬁ cation” of a topic as the topic of 
research and its formulation which appeared at the very end of the whole book (p. 216). 
Of course, such position of explanatory remarks does not inﬂ ict on the importance of the 
topic itself because – as it was said above – questions concerning “human rights” belong 
undoubtedly to the category of “truly important questions” and the problem of a religious 
freedom or a freedom of speech and views – as it is ﬁ nally the main point of the Author’s 
analysis – was and still is a point of controversy in contemporary ethical, social and po-
litical discourse undertaken in era of multiculturalism and globalization.22 On the other 
hand, the internal logic of a composition of the study in whole as well as the logic of the 
exposition of partial conclusions seems to be disturbed when intentions of a researcher 
and a problem of necessity and reasonability of such research occur and are discussed 
altogether with ﬁ nal conclusions. 
To provide, however, a description of the book from a perspective of the Author, ﬁ rst 
of all it must be said that a study is divided into three parts, generally coherent between 
themselves, even if only thematically. In the ﬁ rst, historical-descriptive part, entitled 
Dzieje Zboru Braci Polskich w XVI i XVII stuleciu [The History of the Polish Brethren’s 
Centre in the 16th and 17th century] (p. 14–74) which had unquestionably introductory 
aim, it can be found a depiction of the history of the Kingdom of Poland in the 16th and 
17th centuries, quite often illustrated with quotations of conclusions formulated previous-
ly by representatives of Polish history and Polish legal history (e.g. p. 15; p. 18 n. 7; p. 20 
n. 10; p. 22 n. 14; p. 30 n. 24; p. 31 n. 28). Such moments in the course of history of the 
Kingdom of Poland, as the executive movement with its postulates of necessary reforms 
in the ﬁ eld of religion (e.g. the abolition of a religious jurisdiction over civil citizens) 
or the beginnings and development of Reformation in Poland in comparison to different 
reformatory movements started and provided in Western Europe, constituted an impor-
tant background for consolidation and evolution of the Arians’ thought.23 An internal 
particularity of the Polish Kingdom in the period mentioned – several times emphasized 
by the Author (p. 11, 20, 23 etc.) – is particularly noticeable in the context of history 
of European countries, mostly because of a declared public-law principle of tolerance 
between dissidentes in religione, formally guaranteed in the Act of the Confederation of 
Warsaw (1573), annexed to the so-called Bills of Henry. In his narration on a political 
situation in Europe, the Author mentioned some of representatives of those days, such 
as the Italian group of Vicenza (p. 25–26), Jewish monotheists active in Russia (p. 24), 
a Spaniard Michael Servet (p. 27–29), whose lives and opinions could have been inﬂ u-
ential, at least to a certain degree, on concepts and postulates of the Polish Brethren.
On the other hand, it can be asked if – considering all these – every detail referred by the 
Author of history of the Kingdom of Poland of those times should have been necessarily 
reminded in the light of a main topic of the research, because quite often some informa-
22  Cf., e.g., W. Benedek, K. De Feyter, F. Marrella, Economic Globalization and Human Rights: EIUC 
Studies on Human Rights and Democratization (European Inter–University Centre for Human Rights and 
Democratization), Cambridge 2007; AA. VV., The Tension Between Group Rights and Human Rights: A Mul-
tidisciplinary Approach (Human Rights Law in Perspective), eds. K. De Feyter, G. Pavlakos, Oxford 2008. 
23  For a general view, cf. in part. H.J. Berman, Law and Revolution. II. The Impact of the Protestant 
Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition, Cambridge–Massachusetts–London 2003, passim.
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tion seem to have no connection, even as a background ideas, with a formation of the 
Arians’ thought. Just as an example, one can formulate such doubts towards a quite ex-
tensive description of the (re)Christianization of Lithuania in the 15th century (p. 14–15) 
of doubtful connection with a main plot of the research, even if a method of introduction 
of a new religion – nota bene not completely unknown in Lithuania – by Polish authori-
ties undoubtedly proved the absence of a tendency of imposing a religion by force, which 
can be even more particular if into consideration is taken the way of Christianization 
of other parts of the Europe, i.e. a religion legitimized by “a ﬁ re, a sword and a sign 
of the Cross”. On the other hand, almost without deeper comment (comp. p. 45), the 
Author left the set of postulates of representatives of divers confessions different from 
Catholicism, invoked during a session of the Polish Seym of the Gentry of 1632. Those 
postulates could be regarded as functional equivalents of rights and freedoms present 
in the contemporary discourse and placed in the catalogue of human rights, such as: 
(1) a freedom of confession, a freedom of speech and thought postulated for “all social 
states and people of every condition”,24 strengthen with a claim of a need of particular, 
state’s guarantee in a form of menace of sanction executed by power of the state; or – 
(2) a laicization of the judicature, which can be regarded as an equivalent of contempo-
rary equal rights to a just trial;25 or ﬁ nally – (3) a right to an equal – regardless of confes-
sion – access to ofﬁ ces and dignities. 
Whereas in this part of the book a reader can ﬁ nd detailed information on circum-
stances of the foundation of a confession itself as well as a detailed description of the his-
tory of the Polish Brethren (p. 46 f). The Author depicted quite properly but without any 
selection internal disputes between representatives of Polish Arianism – which, however 
in natural way, concerned mostly fundamental theological questions – as well as splits 
of the group caused by diversity of views. According to the explanation of the Author, 
all these controversies constituted causes for breaking the unity of a confession, and as 
such, were absolutely important and transmissible into “personal religiousness” (p. 46). 
It seems, however, that from the “external” point of view, being a Trinitarian or Anti-
-Trinitarian, tritheist or ditheist, adorant or non-adorant was not of so great importance 
for a reformative program of the Polish Brethren aiming “individual rights”, since one of 
fundamental postulates of universal meaning and unquestionable value from a political 
and social point of view, was a common religious tolerance and its practical reﬂ ection 
as a right of free conscience awarded to every man, regardless of his origin and social 
status. 
In the second part of the book entitled Prawa jednostki ludzkiej w koncepcjach Braci 
Polskich [Rights of an Individual in Concepts of the Polish Brethren] (p. 75–145), the 
Author gave a review of particular topics that formed the Arians’ Thought. Nevertheless 
24  Comp. The Second Vatican Council (Vatican II): Declaration Dignitatis humanae (1965) regarded as 
one of the more controversial of the councilor documents. This Declaration of the Dignity of the Human Per-
son declares a religious freedom, and signiﬁ es development of the doctrine of recent popes on the inviolable 
rights of a human person and the constitutional order of society. Dignitatis Humanae spells out the Church’s 
support for the protection of religious liberty. 
25  Cf. studies published in a volume: Sąd dla obywatela. Opracowanie Zespołu ds. Poprawy Funkcjo-
nowania Sądownictwa Stowarzyszenia Sędziów Polskich “Iustitia” [A Court for a Citizen. A Collaborative 
Study of the Group for Improvement of Functioning of the Judicature of the Association of Polish Judges 
“Iustitia”], ed. J. Przygucki, Warsaw 2009. 
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– in the light of the main topic – as the most important concepts should be regarded those 
ones which concerned social and political problems, particularly a question of “rights” 
and “freedoms” of an individual, a religious tolerance and a postulate of separation of 
a confession and a religious life from the state and the state power. From among mat-
ters treated by the Author, some deserve a special attention, like those which could be 
regarded as a basis for the later “concept of human rights”. Principally, such postulates 
seem to have a “universal” dimension as: the idea of seeking the truth as a derivate of the 
cultural and culture-productive trend of humanism, a postulate of freedom of views and 
opinions, broadly understood religious tolerance, postulates concerning character and 
destination of a private property, a claim of necessity of balanced relations between an 
individual and a state. All aforementioned matters have been depicted with illustration 
of the source material, somehow curiously mixed with Author’s comments. A narration 
constructed in such a way can, however, blur the issue of boundaries between fragments 
originated from sources themselves and commentaries given by the Author. It is quite 
impossible to ﬁ nd any explicit justiﬁ cation for such unclear narration. Maybe the Author 
wanted to escape from an impression of the so-called presentism, named also as the fal-
lacy nunc pro tunc.26 It is obvious that an analysis undertaken in such a little distance 
from a source, should prevent from a scientiﬁ cally controversial temptation of judging 
past events, facts, opinions and theories from a perspective too modern, which, however, 
is quite common in a contemporary research. 
An aim of the third part, meaningfully entitled Kształtowanie się przedoświeceniowej 
ﬁ lozoﬁ i prawa człowieka [A Formation of the pre-Enlightenment Philosophy of Human 
Rights] (p. 146–209), was – according to a declaration of the Author in his Introduction 
(p. 11) – to be a presentation of spectrum of inﬂ uences of the Arians’ Thought on a for-
mation of philosophical systems of such modern philosophers as Hugo Grotius, Baruch 
Spinoza, Gottfried W. Leibniz or Samuel von Pufendorf. Taking this opportunity, the 
Author described thoughts and concepts with many details (also those, which – per se 
fascinating – had nothing in common with a main topic) of aforementioned philosophers. 
Even if this part of the book shows precisely in the best way a philosophical culture of 
the Author and a description of philosophical concepts accomplishes quite well a claim 
of individualism that is indispensable in a scientiﬁ c discourse, it can be asked if – despite 
evident cases of Grotius, Spinoza, Leibniz and Pufendorf, who indeed had connections 
with representatives of the Polish Arianism (which can be proved, e.g., with the corre-
spondence presented by the Author) – a singular fact that an exacting thinker from the 
past was familiar with a particular opinion, can be a basis for a thesis that such opinion 
which inﬂ uenced him was an inspiration to his own concepts or if a particular con-
cept has been borrowed from one person by another. Of course, each of aforementioned 
philosophers had to take into consideration elements of a “scientiﬁ c air” of which he 
breathed and an echo of the Polish Brethren thought without doubts which were present 
in the Netherlands in the 16th and 17th centuries where some of the Brethren (as Andrzej 
Wiszowaty Sr. or Christopher Sand) found exile after their expulsion from Poland in 
1658. Nonetheless it seems that such presumption is too weak to constitute a fundament 
26  For further reading, cf. D.H. Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, 
New York 1970, p. 131 f: Chapter 5: Fallacies on Narration. 
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for a general thesis of an impact of a particular concept on formation or modiﬁ cation of 
philosophical ideas. This remark does not aim to negate the possibility of an inspiration 
or a reception at all (although, the analysis of the Author had, however, proved otherwise, 
i.e. that each of aforementioned philosophers argued to some extent with concepts pre-
sented by the Polish Brethren, or even discarded them: e.g. p. 153 f, 173 f, 176 f, 181 f, 
189–195, 198–201, 207–208) but serves to ﬁ x the attention on – always problematic and 
risky – character of the thesis of an inﬂ uence or a reception of this or that idea, this con-
cept or that institution – which is, however, quite often abused in contemporary schol-
arship. About a formulation of such thesis by the Author speaks not only a title of this 
part of the book (cf. retro), but also titles of separate chapters (e.g. Socynianie a pojęcie 
ekumenizmu Leibniza [Socinians and Leibniz’s notion of ecumenism], and often repeated 
sentence, namely, “concepts are similar”. In spite of such cases where particular author 
of a particular view explicite declared, that this or that idea of the Polish Brethren be-
came an inspiration for acceptance of a particular statement, which can be found in mem-
oires, diaries of letters, or in proper works by such philosopher, it is almost impossible 
to detect all the factors that could have inﬂ uenced a process of formulation of a concept 
present in a history of ideas.
On the other hand, it must be concluded that the Author depicted frequently the pos-
sible interactions between the Arians’ thought and the protestant doctrine of Dutch think-
ers. Nevertheless, after being expelled from Poland, many Polish Arians emigrated not 
only to the Netherlands, but also to England (where their works were known by later phi-
losophers such as John Locke and Pierre Bayle27), East Prussia (e.g. Christopher Crell, 
who, together with his sons, founded new congregations28) and to Transylvania, where 
the Unitarian Church enjoyed freedom (e.g. Andrzej Wiszowaty Jr., born in Prussia, who 
became a teacher at the Unitarian College in Cluj-Napoca29). Even though, most of Polish 
Brethren are sometimes regarded as precursors of Enlightenment, it is also the fact that 
through their connection to Enlightenment thinkers, their ideas inﬂ uenced the Founding 
Fathers of the United States.30 The Author mentioned this latest fact only twice (p. 10, 
209), although the Unitarian Christianity was continued precisely in North America, 
most notably by the Englishman Joseph Priestley,31 who had emigrated to the United 
States and was a friend of both James Madison and Thomas Jefferson (the latter one 
27  Cf., e.g. The Correspondence of John Locke, in 8 volumes, ed. E.S. de Beer, Oxford 1981, vol. 6, 
1981, p. 459 f; for a general view, cf., e.g. H.J. McLachlan Socinianism in seventeenth-century England, 
Oxford 1951, p. 290 f; cf. also New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, ed. S.M. Jackson, 
Michigan 1953, vol. X: Reutsch – Son, p. 490, s.v. Socinus.
28  Cf. in part. W. Munk, entry for: Christopher Crell MD [in:] Munk’s Roll, Royal College of Physicians 
of London, vol. 1, London 1861, p. 428.
29  L. Chmaj Andrzej Wiszowaty jako działacz i myśliciel religijny [Andrzej Wiszowaty as an Activist and 
a Thinker] [in:] idem, Bracia Polscy. Ludzie – idee – wpływy [The Polish Brethren. People – Ideas – Inﬂ u-
ences], Warsaw 1957, p. 350–356.
30  For a general view see: G.W. Cooke, Unitarianism in America: a History of its Origin and Develo-
pment, Boston 1902; E.M. Wilbur, A History of Unitarianism: Socinianism and Its Antecedents, Harvard 
1945.
31  Cf., in part.: T.E. Thorpe, Joseph Priestley, London 1906, p. 106–108; A. Holt, A Life of Joseph 
Priestley, London 1931, p. 133–139; F.W. Gibbs, Joseph Priestley: Adventurer in Science and Champion 
of Truth, London 1965, p. 249 f; M. Philip, Rational Religion and Political Radicalism, “Enlightenment 
and Dissent” 1985, vol. 4, p. 35–46; R.E. Schoﬁ eld, The Enlightened Joseph Priestley: A Study of His Life 
and Work from 1773 to 1804, Pennsylvania 2004, p. 216–223; cf. also: E.F. Smith, Priestley in America, 
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sometimes attended services at Priestley’s congregation in Philadelphia). Particularly 
Priestley was very well informed on the earlier developments of the Polish Brethren 
movement in Poland, especially by his mentions of Socinus and Szymon Budny.32 One 
could also expect a deeper analysis of the inﬂ uences of the Arians’ thoughts in Britain 
(the Authors mentioned this problem on p. 167, 181, 208 n. 105), even though it was 
John Locke who was preceded by a few decades by Samuel Przypkowski on toler-
ance and by Andrzej Wiszowaty on “rational religion”,33 or Isaak Newton who had met 
Samuel Crell, son of Johannes Crellius,34 of the Spinowski family,35 and he collected 
many books from the Racovian Academy.36 Finally, the Englishman John Biddle37 had 
translated two works by Przypkowski (Vita Fausti Socini Fausti Socini Senensis de-
scripta vita ab Equite Polono, 1 ed. 1634 – as The Life of F. Socinus, London 1653; 
Dissertatio de pace et concordia ecclesiae, 1 ed. Amsterdam 1628; Engl. ed. London 
165338), as well as the Racovian Catechism39 and a work by Joachim Stegmann, a “Polish 
Brother” from Germany who was a teacher and rector of the Racovian Academy, and 
who worked with Andrzej Wiszowaty on the revised edition of the Racovian Catechism 
of 1605. Biddle’s followers had very close relations with the Polish Socinian family of 
Crellius (aka Spinowski).40
The book ﬁ nishes with a short summary (p. 210–211) and a bibliography (s. 218–
–231), consisting of editions of the sources and other works. In fact, it seems to be 
1794–1804, Philadelphia 1920; S. Johnson, The Invention of Air: A Story of Science, Faith, Revolution, and 
the Birth of America, New York 2008.
32  With reference to Priestley as a pioneer of Unitarianism in England, who, inter alia, supported the ﬁ rst 
Unitarian congregation at Essex Street Church (London) in Britain by his friend Theophilus Lindsey, in his 
work Letter to a Layman, on the Subject of the Rev. Mr. Lindsey’s Proposal for a Reformed English Church, 
London 1774, printed for J. Wilkie, cf., e.g. A. Holt, A Life , p. 56–64; F.W. Gibbs, Joseph Priestley, p. 88–89; 
R.E. Schoﬁ eld, The Enlightened, p. 26–28, 225, 236–238; From the older literature, cf. in part. J. Toulmin, 
A biographical tribute to the memory of the Rev. Joseph Priestley, L.L.D.F.R.S: In an address to the congre-
gation of Protestant Dissenters at the New Meeting… 22 April 1804, on occasion of his death, 1804.
33  Cf. Andreae Wissowatii – Religio rationalis, seu de Rationis judicio in controversiis, etiam theologicis 
ac religiosis, published posthumously in 1685.
34  Cf. an opinion of H. Hallam, Introduction to the Literature of Europe in the Fifteenth, Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries‎, repr. 2005, Part. 2, p. 417: “Crellius was, perhaps, the most eminent of the Racovian 
school in this century”. For a general view cf. S. Mortimer, Reason and Religion in the English Revolution: 
The Challenge of Socinianism, Cambridge 2010.
35  Cf. Friedrich Wilhelm Bautz, s.v. Samuel Crellius [in:] Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexi-
kon, Bd. 1: Aalders–Faustus v. Byzanz, Hamm 1975, 2 Auﬂ . 1990, Spalte 1158. 
36  Cf. in part. S.D. Snobelen, Isaac Newton, heretic: the strategies of a Nicodemite, “British Journal for 
the History of Science” 1999, vol. 32, p. 381–419.
37  The principal source of information respecting Biddle is the Life by Joshua Toulmin (a noted English 
theologian and a serial dissenting minister of Presbyterian: 1761–1764, Baptist: 1765–1803, and then Unita-
rian: 1804–1815 congregations) published in London 1789, which analyzes all his writings, including several 
translations. Cf. also, more “modern” biographies: J.H. Allen, Historical Sketch of the Unitarian Movement, 
New York 1894, p. 131–135; W. Lloyd, Bicentenary of Barton Street Dissenting Meeting House, Gloucester 
1899, p. 40–50.
38  Cf. Bibliograﬁ a Literatury Polskiej – Nowy Korbut [Bibliography of Polish Literature], t. 3: Piśmien-
nictwo Staropolskie [Old-Polish Writings], Warsaw 1965, p. 140–143.
39  Ch. Hill, Milton and the English Revolution, New York 1977, p. 294.
40  For a general information, cf., in part. Ch. Hill, Change and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century 
England, London 1974, p. 267 f.; idem, Milton, p. 290 f.; idem, A Nation of Change and Novelty: Radical 
Politics, Religion and Literature in Seventeenth-Century England, London 1990, p. 189 f. 
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useless to prove that any other book or study should be added to this list presented by 
the Author, even if this is one of the most common and much-loved remark used in 
reviews – being in fact in opposition to the commonly known principle of charity,41 re-
cently reminded by Tomasz Giaro in his “Intervention” written against a polemic review 
by Aleksander Stępkowski, who criticized work of Franciszek Longchamps de Bérier, 
Nadużycie prawa w świetle rzymskiego prawa prywatnego [The Abuse of Law in the 
light of Roman Private Law].42 On the list of bibliography presented by the Author there 
can however, be found works, mostly written by Polish authors,43 on the subjects of legal 
history, as well as history of religion, history of philosophy or – in general – a history of 
culture or ideas, written both in past and present perspective. 
Generally speaking, the book by Jerzy Kolarzowski on the idea of individual rights in 
writings of the Polish Brethren, presents itself as a study truly original in its form and its 
content, and belongs to the group of studies which – with support of archival sources44 
– have an aspiration to give an answer to the question concerning historical roots of 
contemporary ideas. In other words, authors of this kind of books try to explain in gen-
eral the incarnation, a development, a continuation and a change of a particular idea in 
a course of history. Therefore, it is worth to put some questions in reference to the book 
described. These questions, however, will not concern historical or legal matters, but will 
go to a problem linked to the content of this study, i.e. a methodology of the research in 
a ﬁ eld of legal history. 
3. An External Perspective – the Observer: A problem
of methodological assumption of the research on legal history 
Anyone cannot regard as a pedantry a requirement that a scholar, when undertaking the 
research based on historical sources, not only informs and forewarns his potential read-
41  O.R. Schulz, Verstehen und Rationalität, Frankfurt a.M. 1999, p. 31 f, 88 f. 
42  It is worth to recall a discussion that took part in a forum of the Polish journal „Zeszyty Prawnicze 
Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego” [“ The Law Journal of the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński Uni-
versity” hereafter: ZP UKSW] between authors: A. Stępkowski [ZP UKSW 2005, vol. 5 fasc. 1, p. 255–274; 
ZP UKSW 2006, vol. 6 fasc. 2, p. 189–219] and T. Giaro [ZP UKSW 2006, vol. 6 fasc. 1, p. 279–300; ZP 
UKSW 2007, vol. 7 fasc. 1, p. 273–291], for which a direct impulse were controversies that arose around 
a book by F. Longchamps de Bérier, entitled Nadużycie prawa w świetle rzymskiego prawa prywatnego [The 
Abuse of Law in the light of Roman Private Law], 1st ed. Wrocław 2004, 2nd ed. Warsaw. Aforementioned 
discussion concerned exactly methodological problems of providing the research in legal history. 
43  Comp. references in notes: 20, 29.
44  A book by J. Kolarzowski seems to be complete and exhaustive with regard to its source basis. Comp. 
explanations given by the Author: p. 11–12. Notabene, a postulate according to which it is indispensable to 
make a proper research in archives when one decides to write about a topic belonged to the ﬁ eld of history 
or legal history, at least by its implicit obviousness seems to be worth mentioning. A collection of source 
material, in particular this one from archives, constitute – nolens volens – because of its proper nature, a point 
of depart for every researcher. This postulate has been reminded recently by R. Jastrzębski, in his review of 
a book by M. Paszkowska, Nauka prawa karnego w środowisku Gazety Sądowej Warszawskiej (1873–1918) 
[A Scholarship of Penal Law in the Circle of the Warsaw Judicial Journal], „Forum Prawnicze” [“The Juri-
dical Forum”] 2012, p. 78–81, in part. p. 81.
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ers about methodological assumptions of such research, but also explains a meaning of 
notions and technical terms that he is going to use for a description of social facts which, 
having their place in the past in a similar way as in the present times (especially in a func-
tional sense), still belonged to that particular past. What is more, such an explanation 
seems to be absolutely the key to reconstruction of historical phenomenology of such 
phenomena. This observation is not a postulate of fetishizing the investigative method, 
as well as its aim is not to reject a possible integration of legal scientiﬁ c disciplines, 
with simultaneous afﬁ rmation of an exact dichotomy of phenomena of legal history and 
phenomena of legal modernity.45 The latest approach in some sense would exclude once 
and for all a sensible “genetic” reﬂ ection on “historical moments” of contemporary legal 
concepts. Such claim makes only up the postulate of “reliability” of a scholar’s work-
shop.
A lecture of the book which constitutes an inspiration for present remarks, as the 
matter of settlement, provokes a question as a following one: Did in the past a construc-
tion of “human rights” exist at all? The answer “yes” or “no” in this matter is possible 
only if one establishes how this notion was and is understood. Since one writes about 
a legal construction of “human rights”, thus about a legal construction worked out in re-
lation to deep transformation of continental legal culture having its place in the epoch of 
Enlightenment and about a declaration still present in a legal discourse, which assumes 
that each man is entitled to certain rights of universal, inherent, inalienable, unalterable, 
natural and indivisible character, and a source of their force is a natural human dignity,46 
one therefore should answer that such construction was undoubtedly unknown in the 
past. On the other hand, even in ancient Rome, and later, in mediaeval and modern 
Europe, some particular “rights”, in some sense of analogical function as today’s hu-
man rights, were recognized and were accepted, although as ascribed only to particular 
groups of individuals.47 In the past, problems which appeared to be solved, were similar 
to those of nowadays, even if such problems were described differently and their solu-
tions were diverse. In consequence, for this, what in a discourse of the present times 
belonged to a syntagma “human rights”, in the past it should be seen with different no-
tions, proper for that legal culture, obviously taking into considerations all its elements.48
45  For further reading about the uselessness of dichotomy between the past and the present times, cf. e.g.: 
T. Giaro, Rzymski zakaz nadużycia praw podmiotowych w świetle nowej jurysprudencji pojęciowej [Roman 
prohibition of abuse of right in the light of a new jurisprudence of notions], ZP UKSW vol. 6 fasc. 1 (2006), 
p. 281.
46  For further reading, cf. e.g. A. Łopatka, Prawo człowieka… [A Human Right...], p. 140–142; for some 
skeptical views, cf., however F.J. Wenz, Die Würde des Menschen – Ein Phantom?, “Archiv für Rechts- und 
Sozialphilosophie” 2001, Bd. 87, p. 311–327; J. Isensee, Menschenwürde: die säkulare Gesellschaft auf des 
Suche nach dem Absoluten, “Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts” 2006, Bd. 131, p. 173 f., 194–199.
47  Cf. e.g., such declarations of a respect of rights of particular social class, as: Magna Charta Liber-
tatum, originally issued in 1215 (reissued later in the 13th century in modiﬁ ed versions), by King John of 
England, who proclaimed certain liberties, and accepted that his will was not arbitrary, for example by expli-
citly accepting that no “freeman” (in the sense of non-serf) could be punished except through the law of the 
land; next, the aforementioned Confederation of Warsaw of 1573, the Petition for Laws of 1628; or English 
acts, such as: the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, or the Bill of Rights of 1689. 
48  Cf. in particular a deﬁ nition of a “legal culture” proposed by S. Russocki, Wokół pojęcia kultury 
prawnej [Around a Notion of Legal Culture], „Przegląd Humanistyczny” 1986, vol. 11–12, p. 16: „Kultura 
prawna to zespół splecionych ze sobą postaw i zachowań – tak indywidualnych, jak i zbiorowych – a także 
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It is admitted that only then a vision of a presence of the legal phenomenon is more true 
and more just. In other words, a holistic composition and a comparison of legal cultures 
– the past and the present one – is indispensable49 as well as a determination of discursive 
functions which mentioned syntagma fulﬁ lled once, and fulﬁ lls today.
Such connotation does not exclude, however, a possibility of presentation of a par-
ticular legal construction, even as the in statu nascendi one, as well as it does not exclude 
a possibility of confrontation past and present way of perception of a legal problem, of 
course only with adequately chosen and justly and properly analyzed source material. 
In this way, a topic of the research itself can be validated, as a “topic of a legal history 
domain.”
4. Argumentum: About a usefulness of “anachronical notions”
in the research on legal history
Adjusting modern schemas seems to be as less reasonable as “methodological aberra-
tion” consisting in a description of modern institutions mainly in categories of past phe-
nomena which one could detect or decode. In a romanistics as a ﬁ eld of the research, 
such a tendency is described with words “there were ancient Romans who had already 
done, created, invented etc.”,50 and, in consequence, it can be observed a quite exhaus-
ich rezultatów wobec prawa, czyli powinności, reguł, norm narzucanych, wyposażonych w stosowną sankcję 
i systematycznie egzekwowanych przez właściwy danej społeczności autorytet, a wynikających z podziela-
nego przez tę zbiorowość systemu wartości; rzeczony zespół postaw, zachowań i ich rezultatów, podzielany, 
przyswajany, a także przekazywany innym pod postacią wzorów, służy zarazem w sposób obiektywny i sym-
boliczny do przekształcania zbiorowości ludzkich w odrębną, świadomą tego stanu rzeczy społeczność.” 
[“A ‘legal culture’ is a set of connected between themselves attitudes and behaviors – both individual and 
collective ones – supplied with results towards the law understood as obligations, rules and norms imposed, 
sanctioned and systematically executed by an authority proper for a speciﬁ c community. This corpus iuris 
resulted from values commonly accepted by such community. The aforementioned set of attitudes and be-
haviors, accepted, internalized and passed to others in the form of models, serves in the same time – objec-
tively and symbolically – to a transformation of human communities into one particular community, indepen-
dent and conscious of this level of development.”] As for this question, cf. also: E. Borkowska-Bagieńska, 
O pożytkach badań nad kulturą prawną [With reference to Proﬁ ts of the Research on a Legal Culture] [in:] 
Przez tysiąclecia: państwo – prawo – jednostka [Across Millennia: State – Law – Individual], vol. III, Ka-
towice 20001, p. 28–40; A. Rosner, Badania nad kulturą prawną. Próba zarysowania problematyki [The 
Research on a Legal Culture. An Attempt to Delimitation of the Problem], [w:] Z dziejów kultury prawnej. 
Studia oﬁ arowane Profesorowi Juliuszowi Bardachowi w 90-lecie urodzin [From the History of a Legal 
Culture. Studies dedicated to Professor Juliusz Bardach for the 90th Anniversary], Warsaw 2004, p. 585–597. 
49  Comp. M. Graziadei, Comparative Law, Legal History and the Holistic Approach to Legal Cultures, 
“Zeitschrift für Europäische Privatrecht” 1999, p. 531–543; cf. also previously published studies concerning 
problems with application of a comparative method in the ﬁ eld of history, in particular, legal history: A. 
Aymard, L’évolution des methods de la recherché historique [in:] L’Encyclopédie française, Paris 1959, 
vol. 20, p. 4 f; J. Bardach, Metoda porównawcza w zastosowaniu do powszechnej historii państwa i prawa 
[A Comparative Method in use of the History of Law and State] [in:] idem, Themis a Clio czyli Prawo a Hi-
storia [Themis and Clio, means Law and History], Warsaw 2001, p. 99 f. 
50  For more detailed description of so-called praesumptio similitudinis of Roman and modern institu-
tions, cf. K. Zweigert, Die “praesumptio similitudinis” als Grundsatzvermutung rechtsvergleichender Me-
thode [in:] Inchieste di diritto comparato, a cura di M. Rotondi, vol. 2, Padova 1973, p. 737 f.; for a critical 
Libertas scribendi – libertas philosophandi...
80 Paulina Święcicka
tive tendency to derive contemporary legal institutions directly from Roman law, or – 
what is even more controversial – to prove contemporary utilization of ancient legal 
institution.51 Meanwhile, the most common situation is that tertium datur, so it is impos-
sible to speak both about the full identity or a complete lack of correspondence between 
past and modern institutions. So next, an indirect correspondence, in a form of elements 
or roots, beginnings or stirrings, or ﬁ nally, only functional surrogates52 can be most com-
monly observed – which should be rationally found and properly explained. A statement 
that a perspective of a discussion concerning “personal rights” in the 16th and 17th centu-
ries had to be different – because historically determined – from the contemporary one,53 
it is a particular truism in such context, at least because of a reason of different ecclesio-
logical consciousness of the people in the past as well as state- or political- determination 
of religion, characteristic for them or ﬁ nally, a different concept of the state itself (the 
latest fact, quite important in the context of the modern and the contemporary theory of 
the state, has been completely neglected by the Author). These aspects are not clear how-
ever, in the light of the Author’s divagations, since he, only in the Introduction, em-
ployed both terms “individual rights” and “human rights”, using them as synonyms 
which can be a simple lingual trick or can suggest an attempt to identiﬁ cation of both 
syntagmas. In such a way appears a problem of “translation” of some social phenomena 
into categories of legal and jurisprudential language, or – in other words – a problem of 
choice of use of “anachronic notions” and “legal notions” of contemporarily determined 
signiﬁ cance.54 Before the times of Enlightenment no one had used a category of “human 
rights”, no one had even known this syntagma as a “technical term”, not mentioning any 
consistent “theory of human rights”.55 The history of ideas – similarly to the history of 
legal facts – can be seen, according to German philosopher and sociologist, Niclas 
Luhman56 as a continuous process of differentiation of diverse notions, institutions and 
rules. The reality, however, also the legal one, in general complicates itself, getting as 
view, cf., inter alia, R. Munday, A counting for an encounter [in:] Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and 
Transitions, eds. P. Legrand, R. Munday, Cambridge 2005, p. 3–28, in part. p. 12–14.
51  Cf., e.g., quite recently published book concerning this problem: R. Zimmermann, Rechtsgeschichte 
und Privatrechtsdogmatik, Karlsruhe 2000; cf. also G. Samuel, Epistemology, propaganda and Roman law: 
some reﬂ ections on the history of the subjective right, “The Journal of Legal History” 1989, vol. 10, fasc. 2, 
p. 161–179; comp. also H.-C. Grigoleit, Das historische Argument in der geltendrechtlichen Privatrechtsdog-
matik, “Zeitschrift für Neuere Rechtsgeschichte” 2008, Bd. 30, fasc. 3–4, p. 259–271.
52  T. Giaro, Rzymski zakaz nadużycia praw podmiotowych w świetle nowej jurysprudencji pojęciowej 
[Roman Interdiction of Abuse of Personal Rights in the Light of the Current Jurisprudence of Notions], ZP 
UKSW 2006, vol. 6 fasc. 1, p. 282–283.
53  Comp. J. Bardach, Metoda porównawcza… [A Comparative Method], p. 127, on theoretical premises 
in the research on the legal history, which must take into consideration very different historical conditions. 
54  Comp. A. Berger, From “ius civile” to “civil law” [in:] Festschrift für G. Kisch, Stuttgart 1955, 
p. 141 f. 
55  Cf., recently, D.P. Visser, The Legal Historian as Subversive: or Killing the Capitoline Geese [in:] 
idem, Essays in the History of Law, Cape Town 1989, p. 1–31, in part. about such – nota bene truly contro-
versial – problem of “too modern” reading of historical sources, with help of “modern categories”, which 
– for the reason of cultural realities of the period described – not always or not exactly suit to this historical 
past, just only because of the reason that such notions have meaning not always determined, and quite often 
temporarily dependent.
56  N. Luhmann, Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts. Beiträge zur Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie, Frank-
furt a.M. 1981, p. 11 f. 
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a result more and more multiplex every day and full of new, more specialized formulas 
of acting. In consequence, it seems absolutely rational to accept a relativistic attitude 
towards the past and the present times, regardless of a possible answer to the question 
concerning historical forms of the only one phenomenon or different phenomena being 
in relation, although separated from themselves. A lack of explanation from the part of 
the Author results with necessity of a question about what exactly was to be elucidated, 
even if, in the second part of his book, he seemed (for the reason that a reader can ﬁ nd 
no direct or even indirect explanation of this quite important methodological matter) to 
adopt a “genetic” view aiming to show the relationship between a set of postulates of the 
Polish Brethren, which in general could be named “individual rights” and a modern con-
cept called “human rights”. “Human rights”, even if we classify them as a kind of mod-
ern phenomenon universally presented in our cultural circle, are to be regarded as a phe-
nomenon connected with a particular historical epoch. The idea of “rights and freedoms” 
changed itself during the course of history but – as the concept of human rights – ap-
peared in the times of Enlightenment, due to other concepts of this epoch of rationalism, 
mixed with a necessity of re-deﬁ nition and re-location of some material goods and old 
ideas as a solution to problems that occurred in relation to the industrial revolution.57 
Still, the aforementioned concept is more a “genetic” product of humanistic thought, 
condemning the existence of feudalism, with its restrictions coming from the concept of 
the state itself as the absolute one, a feudal law, a guild-system, an interdiction of a free 
commerce concerning some sort of goods (e.g. lands), an accumulation of a capital, and 
ﬁ nally an impossibility of organization of enterprises and private initiatives. All these 
blocked for years a proper development of economical and industrial relationships and 
resulted with “a society without universal rights”. Therefore, all attempts towards “hu-
man rights” were closely bounded with a necessity of changes, particularly a recognition 
of a universal equality between the people,58 especially in the sense of acceptance of 
a personal freedom, as well as a change of a political, social and legal system as two mo-
ments when some “program slogans” appeared and were founded on connection of two 
notions of ius and libertas.59 These program postulates connected precisely to necessary 
recognition of a freedom of individual, a private property, the equality in law, as well as 
a postulate of creation of certain guarantees of their observation. It can be seen that in 
such postulates there is a return but only in some intellectual sense of some claims which 
appeared in the past, in embryonic form, however, did not become – because of the fac-
tual and legally-logical impossibility of such change, for the reason of “naturalness” of 
a slavery or a serfdom – legal constructions, and constitutional principles. On the other 
hand, guaranteeing to citizens general rights, was in accordance with general images of 
the essence of freedom: French Declaration of Man and Citizen of 1789, declared, inter 
alia: “[...] natural, inalienable and holy rights of a man, such as freedom, private prop-
erty, safety and resistance against pressure”. According to the doctrine of human rights, 
57  For further reading, cf. K. Opałek, Koncepcja praw… [The Concept of Rights...], p. 18 f; I. Szabo, 
Fondements historiques…, p. 13 f. 
58  Comp. M. Bedjaoui [in:] Universalité des droits de l’homme dans un Monde Pluraliste, Conseil de 
l’Europe 1990, p. 42. 
59  Comp. M. Villey, Leçons d’histoire de la philosophie du droit, Paris 1962, p. 240 f; about a category 
of so-called “public personal rights”.
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it was not the state who such rights determined and bestowed,60 because rights and free-
doms were given by nature or a God,61 but, a contrario, it was a task and a duty of the 
state to guarantee to an individual an observance of them as a particular emanation of the 
natural law. The state, by refraining from interference in man’s freedom, should how-
ever, in the same time, protect him against a violation of these rights by others, and most 
notably, by itself as the power or ofﬁ cials as its representatives. Any limitation of such 
universally understood freedom of an individual was recognized as admissible only in 
indispensable range for the reason of necessary protection of freedom of other citizens 
and for the ultimate reason of the state.62 All these observations are not anything new but 
are based on conclusions well-established in the scientiﬁ c literature. Therefore, one can 
require their recognition by any author who wants – as one can presume only after read-
ing a title of the aforementioned book – to write “descriptively” about “ individual 
rights”, “man rights” and the modern concept of “human rights”. As a particular cliché 
– what, by no means, does not devalue at all already ﬁ xed truths63 – it is worth sometimes 
to remind that the law is a cultural phenomenon, which cannot be separated from a gen-
eral intellectual culture of a certain epoch. The research on phenomena of the past, such 
as historical investigations on the legal history, which aim to grasp an idea or an institu-
tion in statu nascendi, can be, however, and without any doubts are, of great, especially 
when creative, importance, but only if they are realized as a value itself,64 and not only 
as inspired and directed into ﬁ nding a historical conﬁ rmation or a historical exempliﬁ ca-
tion of legal phenomena of the present times.65 It does not seem justiﬁ ed therefore, that 
60  Cf. P. Häberle, Die Verfassung des Pluralismus. Studien zur Verfassungstheorie der offenen Gesell-
schaft, Königstein 1980, p. 79 f; comp., however, a different view: J. Isensee, Wer deﬁ niert die Freiheitsrech-
te?, Karlsruhe 1980; and, most recently rev. R. Sobański, O Karcie… [About the Charter...], p. 188 f.
61  Cf. studies by such philosophers, as: John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1689); T. Paine, 
Rights of Man (1791), Rights of Man, Part the Second, Combining Principle and Practice (1792); comp. 
the Encyclical of Pius XI: Mit Brennender Sorge (14.03.1937); G. Filibeck, Les droits de l’homme dans 
l’enseigmenent de l’Eglise: de Jean XXIII à Jean-Paul II, Cité de Vatican 1992, p. 34 f.; cf. also K. Opałek, 
Koncepcja praw… [The Concept of Rights...], p. 29 f, who underlined this unethical aspect of attribution of 
some rights to an individual. 
62  Comp. T. van Boven, Les critères de distinction des droits de l’homme [in:] Les dimensions, cit., 
p. 46 f., about this so-called « inviolable core of human rights »; comp. also A. Łopatka, Prawo człowieka… 
[A Human Right...], p. 143–144. 
63  Comp. T. Giaro, Cywilizacja prawa rzymskiego… [A Civilization of Roman Law...], p. 69.
64  Comp. G. Crifò, Some Reﬂ ections on History and Dogma as Jurists’ Tools [in:] Critical Studies in 
Ancient Law, Comparative Law and Legal History, ed. J.W. Cairns, O. Robinson, Oxford–Portland Oregon 
2001, p. 37 f., p. 39.
65  Comp. A. Watson, The Evolution of Law, Oxford 1985, p. 3: “One cannot understand legal develo-
pment in general without a new look at the history of individual changes; and that, in turn, a new approach 
to legal development in general can lead to a more just appreciation of individual legal changes.”; comp. 
T. Giaro, Cywilizacja prawa rzymskiego… [A Civilization of Roman Law...], p. 77, about such, not always just 
and justiﬁ ed, attempts of scholars of a contemporary romanistics, founded on a presupposition that the Roman 
law should be regarded as a “additional value” of a currently binding civil law; comp., however, T. Giaro, 
Prawo a historia w dobie globalizacji. Nowe rozdanie kart [Law and History in the Times of Globalization. 
A New Play] [in:] Prawo w dobie globalizacji [The Law in the Times of Globalization], ed. T. Giaro, Warsaw 
2011, p. 73; about a postulate of necessity of participation of legal historians in contemporary discourse, as 
well as of a particular necessity of a use modern notions in purpose to describe the past; cf. also, about a phe-
nomenon of “antiquarianism” in historical sciences: D. Heirbaut, Comparative law and Zimmermann’s new 
ius commune: A life line or death sentence for legal history? Some reﬂ ections on the use of legal history for 
83
for different aims, such as for a purpose of justiﬁ cation of a legitimacy of undertaking of 
the research on legal history topics, a quest of historical truth is replaced with construc-
tions, undoubtedly interesting from the point of view of modern reader, however, a-his-
torical in its proper nature.
***
As it was mentioned above, in the discourse of the present times provided by intellectu-
alists representing almost every branch of contemporary broadly understood discipline 
of the social research, most notably the law as well, there can be found references to 
“human rights”. It is also worth mentioning that this time there is no need to restrict 
himself in such discourse into the group of continental countries for the reason that in 
relation to somehow universal incorporation of the European Convention of Rights of 
Man and Citizen, ﬁ nally binding from 1953, into internal legal systems, a real “world 
trend” for the construct of “human rights” formed, which – as par excellence rights of 
persons – have their unquestionable position also among Anglo-Saxons authors.66 It can 
be also concluded that in consideration of today’s, quite easy noticeable, phenomena 
of exhausting of traditional elements of the intellectual reality, a crisis67 or a death,68 
overused by scholars, such “universal life” of this syntagma in scientiﬁ c discourse is at 
least truly particular. The Author is therefore correct stating that the presence of “human 
rights” in the world of ideas is universal and will overcome all cultural crises. The other 
question is, however, if it is worth to compare the postulates and slogans of the times of 
Reformation and Contra-reformation – on a “genitive rule”69 – with today’s categories of 
the contemporary secularized culture. In the same way Edmund Husserl made postulates 
towards a philosophical reﬂ ection, having declared that a deeper and critical reﬂ ection 
on the past is required, for a purpose of radical “self-understanding”,70 adding also that 
[...] true understanding of the beginnings is possible in a full way only by parting from a today’s 
knowledge and giving a careful glimpse into the past, because without understandings of the begin-
nings any development, as a development of an essence, is blind and speechless.71
comparative law and vice versa [in:] Ex Iusta Causa Traditum: Essays in Honour of E. H. Pool, ed. H. Van 
den Bergh, Pretoria 2005, p. 139 f. 
66  Cf., e.g., J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford 1980; Lord Irvine of Lairg, The Deve-
lopment of Human Rights in Britain under an Incorporated Convention on Human Rights [in:] Public Law, 
1998, p. 221–236, in part.: “This Bill will therefore create a more explicitly moral approach to decisions and 
decision making; will promote both a culture where positive rights and liberties become the focus and con-
cern of legislators, administrators and judges alike; and a culture in judicial decision making where there will 
be a greater concentration on substance rather than form.” 
67  Cf., e.g., E. Husserl, Kryzys nauk europejskich i fenomenologia transcedentalna [A Crisis of European 
Sciences and a Transcendental Phenomenology], transl. S. Walczewska, Toruń 1999. 
68  Cf., e.g.: F. Fukuyama, Koniec historii [The End of the History], transl. T. Bieroń, M. Wichrowski, 
Poznań 1996 (2nd ed. 2000); D. Kuspit, Koniec sztuki [The End of the Art], transl. J. Borowski, Gdańsk 2006; 
AA.VV., Koniec mitu niewinności [The End of a Myth of Innocence], ed. L. Kopciewicz, E. Zierkiewicz, 
Warsaw 2009. 
69  Comp. T. Giaro, Cywilizacja prawa rzymskiego… [A Civilization of Roman Law...], p. 70, with refer-
ence to rightness and usefulness of such „genetically determined comparisons”. 
70  After: E. Husserl, Kryzys nauk europejskich… [A Crisis of European Sciences...], p. 20. 
71  After: ibidem, p. 63–64.
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It seems, however, impossible to “understand the beginnings” with modern catego-
ries and concepts, especially those in which there can be seen a deep connection with 
current ideology.
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